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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner fully set forth the facts in its initial
Brief, and offers the following clarifications of several
erroneous or misleading statements made in Respondents1 Brief:
Contrary to Respondent's statement on page 4 of their
Brief, there is substantial evidence in the record that
Robinson's illness was, in fact, due to his use of marijuana.
The Judge found that his symptoms of paranoia were attributed
to his cannabis use and that Robinson's most recent
hospitalization was related at least in part to marijuana use.
R. 7.

The doctor's report dated May 19, 1986, on which the

Judge relied, listed "cannabis dependence" and "cannabis
delusional disorder" as diagnoses and expressly stated that the
claimant's "paranoia almost undoubtedly is due to his cannabis
use."

R. 148-52.

That same report further described the

"propensity of marijuana to accumulate in the central nervous
system."

R. 150.

In a subsequent medical report dated June 4,

1986, the doctor again confirmed the adverse effect of
Robinson's marijuana use by stating:
At this time, Michael's problems appear to be
related basically to intermittent marijuana
use, which for a period of time, creates
paranoia and decompensation.
R. 156.

The record, therefore, is clear, and the only

conclusion that can be drawn is that Robinson's marijuana use
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had an adverse effect on his health and was a diagnosed cause
of his hospitalization.
Respondents also state on page 4 of their Brief that
there is no indication in the record that Robinson was less
able to perform his work after he was released by the doctors
on May 19 than he was before his illness.

This statement is

unsupported by the record and runs counter to the express
finding of the Judge that Robinson's physician placed him on
neuroleptic drugs and recommended he receive supervision before
working independently as an operator of the gas plant.

R. 8.

The record is also clear that there were no unsupervised
positions available at the gas plant.

The only positions

available at the time Robinson was released from the hospital
required unsupervised operation of the plant.

R. 73, 75.

Respondents further state on page 4 of their Brief
that after Robinson's hospitalization, he was willing to become
involved in ChamplinTs drug rehabilitation program.

Robinson's

willingness to do so after his hospitalization has no bearing
on whether or not he was terminated for just cause.

The record

is clear that Champlin's drug rehabilitation program was
structured to allow employees to come forward voluntarily and
admit themselves to treatment.

R. 76.

Robinson, however,

chose not to take advantage of this program during his long
period of marijuana abuse.

R. 76.
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Respondents also erroneously state on page 29 of their
Brief that Robinson was employed for "some four years?f by
Champlin.

In fact he was only employed by Champlin for

approximately 14 months.

R. 105-06.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner Champlin Petroleum Company ("Champlin")
contends that the decision of the Board of Review ("Board") is
unreasonable and should be reversed as a matter of law because
the only conclusion that can be drawn from the facts is that
the conduct of Respondent Michael D. Robinson ("Robinson") in
chronically abusing marijuana and failing to admit himself into
Champlin1s drug rehabilitation program was sufficiently
culpable and within his control to constitute "just cause" for
termination within the meaning of the applicable provisions of
the Utah Employment Security Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-4-5(b)(l) (1974 & Supp. 1986), and the Regulations issued
thereunder.*

Champlin further contends that the Board in its

decision failed to apply the facts to the law, gave inadequate
reasoning, and reached inconsistent and unsupported conclusions.
In reply to Respondent's Brief, Champlin argues that
Robinson's conduct in using marijuana and ignoring Champlin's

* The definition and elements of the term "just cause"
are set forth in the Rules and Regulations of the Department of
Employment Security which are appended to Petitioner's initial
Brief as Appendix 1.
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drug rehabilitation program violated Champlin1s established
standards of employee conduct and was clearly volitional and
within his control.

His marijuana use adversely affected his

health and his ability to perform the job for which he had been
trained.

In the particular context of his employment as an

operator of a natural gas processing plant, his conduct was
wrong and seriously adverse to Champlin1s rightful interests in
ensuring the safety of persons and property.
ARGUMENT
I.
Robinson's marijuana use was within his control.
Respondents contend that the element of control is the
major factor in this case.

Under the administrative definition

of "just cause," control exists when the claimantfs conduct is
within his power and capacity to control or prevent.

The

conduct in question here is Robinson's long-term abuse of an
illegal drug, which adversely affected his health and rendered
him unable to perform the job for which he had been trained.
Robinson admitted that he had used marijuana for many
years.

He made the decision to smoke marijuana and the

decision to stop smoking marijuana.

R. 122, 123, 109.

Of his

own volition, he chose not to admit himself into Champlin's
drug rehabilitation program.

R. 76.

His conduct was clearly

volitional, and, therefore, within his power and capacity to
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control or prevent.

See Clearfield City v. Department of

Employment Security, 663 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1986); Grinnell
v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah 1987).
As Respondents have recognized, the issue of control
is crucial to the resolution of this case.

Although the Judge

concluded that Robinson lacked the requisite control, he gave
no explanation of what facts he relied upon to reach that
conclusion.

In an effort to explain this obvious gap in the

Judge's reasoning, Respondents ignore Robinson's own testimony
concerning the nature of his marijuana use and now offer the
novel and wholly unsupported theory that his marijuana use was
somehow induced by a pre-existing mental condition, and,
therefore, not within his control.

No such finding was ever

made by the Judge or the Board, and there is not a shred of
evidence in the record to support such a far-fetched theory.
II.
Robinson's drug use adversely affected his ability to
perform his job.
Respondents argue that in order to disqualify a
claimant from benefits under the Act because of drug abuse
there must be an indication that his job performance was
adversely affected by his drug abuse problems.

They contend

there is insufficient evidence that Robinson's drug abuse
affected his ability to perform on the job.
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In this case the record is clear, and the Judge so
fpund, that Robinson's marijuana use was a cause of his
paranoia and his hospitalization. R. 7, 10, 156.

It adversely

affected his health and rendered him unfit to perform the
technical and demanding job of operating a natural gas
processing plant for which he had been trained.

R. 150.

Thus,

under Respondents' own legal standard, Robinson's conduct
warrants denial of benefits.
Champlin freely acknowledges that it had no indication
prior to Robinson's hospitalization that he was using marijuana
or that he may have been impaired as a result thereof.
However, Robinson worked without on-the-job supervision, making
it unlikely that any actual impairment would have been
discovered by Champlin unless a serious accident or other
incident occurred.
Respondents argue that there was no evidence that
Robinson was ever actually impaired while on the job.
Respondents, however, ignore the obvious fact that Robinson's
ability to perform his job was, in fact, severely impaired and
adversely affected by his long-term marijuana use.

He was

hospitalized and rendered unable to perform his job.

R. 7.

Upon his release from the hospital, Robinson was not, in his
doctor's opinion, able to work without direct supervision.
150.

R.

As the doctor expressly stated in his report of June 4,
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1986, Robinson's problems "appear to be related basically to
intermittent marijuana use, which for a period of time, creates
paranoia and decompensation."

R. 156.

His conduct in using

marijuana disabled him from continued effectiveness as a gas
plant operator.

See Clearfield City v. Department of

Employment Security, 663 P.2d at 445.
Based on the record and the Judge's findings, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that Robinson's long-term
marijuana abuse adversely affected his health, resulted in his
lengthy hospitalization, and adversely affected his ability to
perform the technical, unsupervised and potentially hazardous
job, for which he had been trained, of operating a natural gas
processing plant without direct supervision.
III.
Robinson's conduct violated Champlin's established
standards of employee conduct.
Robinson fully understood the nature of his conduct
and the effect that it could have upon his employment.
Grinnell v. Board of Review, 732 P.2d at 115.

See

He believed

that his marijuana use was an abuse of Champlin's anti-drug
policy, and testified that was why he felt guilty about smoking
marijuana.

R. 120.

He further testified that he believed

smoking marijuana was not good for him and that one of the
reasons he stopped was because of his concern that it might
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affect his job performance.

R. 119-20.

He was well aware of

Champlinfs anti-drug and sick leave policies and of Champlin's
drug rehabilitation program to which he could have voluntarily
admitted himself without adversely affecting his continued
employment with Champlin.

R. 118, 154, 76.

Champlin had

established policies for expected conduct and Robinson was well
aware of those policies and the effect that his drug abuse
could have upon his continued employment.

See Grinnell v.

Board of Review, 732 P.2d at 115.
Respondents argue that there was no evidence that
Robinson ever violated Champlin's anti-drug policy by
possessing, selling or using drugs in the workplace or
reporting to work under the influence of drugs.

This argument

completely ignores Robinson's own testimony that he believed
his marijuana use was an abuse of Champlin1s anti-drug policy
and his expressed concern that it might have an adverse effect
on his job performance.

R. 119-20.

It also ignores the

express findings made by the Judge that Robinson's paranoia
resulted from his marijuana use and that such drug abuse
exacerbated an underlying manic depressive disease.

R. 7, 8.

Respondents' argument also runs counter to the medical reports
of Robinson's physician indicating that marijuana was having an
adverse effect on Robinson's health and work capability.
149.

R.

The doctor diagnosed Robinson with cannabis delusional
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disorder and cannabis dependence and further expressly noted
the propensity of marijuana to accumulate in the central
nervous system.

R. 149-50.

In a letter from Robinson's

physician dated June 4, 1986, the doctor again reiterated that
Robinson's problems appeared to be related basically to
intermittent marijuana use, which, over a period of time,
"creates paranoia and decompensation."

R. 156.

The record is

therefore clear that Robinson's marijuana abuse adversely
influenced his health and impaired his ability to perform the
job for which he had been trained.
IV.
The public interest warrants denial of
benefits for employees who abuse drugs.
In holding that Robinson's long-term marijuana abuse
and failure to admit himself into Champlin's drug
rehabilitation program were not sufficiently culpable or within
his control to constitute just cause, the Board has, in effect,
determined that it is not in the State's interest to deny
benefits to employees who flout their employer's drug policies
and ignore drug rehabilitation programs.

Champlin is seriously

concerned with the adverse effects of drug use in the
workplace.

Champlin was especially concerned to learn that one

of its gas plant operators had been chronically abusing
marijuana and, as a result, suffered serious and adverse health
effects.

Champlin's anti-drug policy and drug rehabilitation
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program were established to discourage drug use and encourage
employees with such personal problems to admit themselves
voluntarily for treatment.

Champlin believes it to be in its

best interest to encourage employees with such problems to come
forward and admit themselves into the program and to discourage
employees from persisting in the use of illegal drugs and
ignoring the opportunity provided by the employer for
rehabilitation.
These same goals are in the best interest of the
State.

By awarding or denying unemployment benefits, the State

voices the public interest in discouraging employees from
conduct which is wrongful and otherwise adverse to the rightful
interests of their employers.

Where the conduct in question is

the abuse of illegal drugs, it is clearly in the interest of
the State to encourage employers to provide drug rehabilitation
programs and to encourage employees to cease the use of illegal
drugs and voluntarily enter such programs.
The public interest is simply not served by awarding
benefits to employees who choose to ignore employers' drug
policies and treatment programs.

The State has already

determined that use of marijuana is a criminal offense.
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1986 Repl. Vol.).

Utah

Awarding benefits to

employees who engage in such behavior to the detriment of their
employer's rightful interests, effectively condones it and
frustrates the success of anti-drug programs by sending the
wrong message to employees.
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When viewed in the specific context of Robinson's
employment with Champlin, the need to discourage drug abuse is
especially apparent.

As an operator of a natural gas

processing plant, Robinson worked alone and independently in a
technical and demanding job.

R. 65.

He had the potential for

encountering emergency, life-threatening situations which
required him to respond with fast, carefully executed action.
R. 8.

As found by the Judge, poor judgment or delayed response

on his part could have resulted in an injury or severe property
damage.

R. 8.

Fortunately, no such incident occurred.

Under

the circumstances, his drug abuse posed a clear potential for
serious harm to persons and property.

His conduct in

persisting in the use of marijuana and failing to admit himself
into the company's drug rehabilitation program was seriously
wrong and adverse to Champlin's rightful interests in ensuring
the safety of persons and property.

See Kehl v. Board of

Review, 700 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
The Board's decision is unreasonable and should be
reversed, because the only conclusion that can be drawn from
the facts is that Robinson's long-term use of marijuana, his
receipt of sick leave benefits for drug-related illness in
violation of company policy, and his failure to admit himself
voluntarily into Champlin's drug rehabilitation program were
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within his control and sufficiently culpable and adverse to
Champlin's interests to constitute just cause under
§ 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Act.

Champlin further argues that the

decisions of the Judge and the Board failed to apply the facts
to the appropriate legal standards and failed to provide an
adequate explanation for the conclusion that Robinson's conduct
was not sufficiently culpable or within his control to
constitute just cause.
The lack of any express reasoning or explanation on
the questions of control and culpability poses one of the most
troubling aspects of this case.

The Judge and Board simply

failed to explain their reasoning on these crucial elements of
their decision.

See Nichols v. Utah State Department of

Employment Security, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17,

P.2d

(Mar. 26, 1987), wherein the Court in affirming an
administrative decision under a related provision of the Act,
pointed out that the trial judge had "thoroughly explained his
reasons."

This obvious shortcoming in the decisions of the

Judge and the Board is emphasized by Respondents' efforts to
explain a lack of control with the wholly unsupported theory
that Robinson had a mental condition which induced him,
uncontrollably, to use marijuana.

It is further evidenced by

the Board's mischaracterization of Champlin's drug
rehabilitation program in an apparent effort to theorize
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another explanation for the Judge's unexplained conclusion on
the elements of control and culpability.

In doing so, the

Board drew conclusions that were factually incorrect and
completely unsupported by any evidence in the record.
If not reversed on the issue of just cause, the
Board's decision should be reversed and remanded for further
consideration on the grounds that it failed to apply the facts
to the law, lacked adequate reasoning, and contained
inconsistent and unsupported conclusions.

See Trotta v.

Department of Employment Security, 664 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah
1983).
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 1987.
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H. Michael Keller
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Attorneys for Petitioner
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

7067K

-13-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Reply Brief to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^ ^ q a y

of April, 1987, to the following:

Winston M. Faux
Special Assistant Attorney General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
1234 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Respondents

7067K
042087

-14-

